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ARTICLE 
DIVINITY VS. DISCRIMINATION: 
CURTAILING THE DIVINE REACH 
OF CHURCH AUTHORITY 
WHITNEY ELLENBY· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Church authority to practice gender discrimination in 
employment decisions represents the collision of principles of 
religious liberty on one hand, and the need to eradicate invidi-
ous discrimination on the other. In order to secure the free 
exercise of religion, the First Amendment prohibits legislation 
which interferes with or significantly abridges religious belief 
or conduct. 1 To the extent that employment decisions repre-
sent the extension of religious belief, churches have a strong 
claim of immunity from judicial review of their decisions. Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 thus exempts religious 
entities from civil liability when their discriminatory conduct is 
religiously motivated. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) 
states: 
* J.D. 1995, Georgetown University Law Center. The author wishes to ac-
knowledge the assistance of all those whose efforts made publishing this article 
possible; my parents, for their unconditional patience and support; Professor David 
Saperstein, Dean Mark Tushnet and Ronnie London for their outstanding editing; 
and Professor Oliver Thomas, without whom this article would never have been 
written. 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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This subchapter shall not apply. . . to a reli-
gious corporation, association, educational insti-
tution, or society with respect to the employment 
of individuals of a particular religion to perform 
work connected with the carrying on by such 
corporation, association, educational institution, 
or society of its activities.3 
While such accommodation arguably runs afoul of non-estab-
lishment principles of the First Amendment\ the Supreme 
Court in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos5 unani-
mously held that the exemption did not rise to the level of a 
law respecting an establishment of religion.6 
Although the Supreme Court has not recognized a consti-
tutional right to discriminate on the basis of religion against 
individuals who perform purely "secular" functions, the court 
has upheld Title VII's statutory exemption for discriminating 
with respect to "religious" functions. 7 Title VII has been in-
terpreted to bar race and sex discrimination by religious orga-
nizations toward their non-minister employees; yet, attempting 
to forbid religious discrimination against non-minister employ-
ees where the position involved has any religious significance 
is uniformly recognized as constitutionally suspect, if not for-
bidden.8 
Notwithstanding Amos, the statutory exemption still en-
genders considerable controversy among federal courts left to 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a)(1988). 
4. See infra notes 104-160 discussing the Establishment Clause. 
5. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
6. [d. at 338. In Amos, a building engineer was discharged by The Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints after 16 years of service because he failed to 
qualify for a church certificate. [d. at 330. The District Court held that the ex-
emption applied thereby allowing the Church to discriminate against the building 
engineer. See id. at 333. The Supreme Court reversed after reasoning that 
"[w]here, as here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation 
that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the exemp-
tion come packaged with benefits to secular entities. [d. at 338. 
7. [d. at 338. See also McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 
1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 896 (1972); infra notes 25-67 and accompanying text 
discussing McClure. 
8. See, e.g., EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Maguire v. Marquette Univ., 627 F. Supp. 1499 (E.D. Wis. 1986); Little v. Wuerl, 
929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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interpret its precise scope.9 While the statute permits religious 
institutions to engage in religious discrimination, the legal 
boundaries between religious and other forms of prohibited dis-
crimination, such as gender discrimination, remain unclear. 
Specifically, the vague guidelines give rise to such questions as 
how "religious" an institution must be to qualify for the exemp-
tion, or whether employment decisions constitute the type of 
"activities" courts are precluded from overseeing. 
Under current federal court jurisprudence, church authori-
ty to discriminate along gender lines, and the corresponding 
authority of courts to review and regulate such conduct, turns 
largely on two considerations: the nature of the institution and 
the nature of the employment position.lO The various employ-
ment positions can be broken down into four distinct categories 
of cases: (1) ministerial functions in pervasively sectarian insti-
tutions; (2) ministerial functions in religiously-affiliated insti-
tutions; (3) non-ministerial functions in pervasively sectarian 
institutions; and (4) non-ministerial functions in religiously-
affiliated institutions.11 Such classifications are useful in de-
termining at precisely what level the responsibilities assumed 
by employees are so secular in nature that state regulation of 
employment decisions regarding those positions cannot be 
contested on religious grounds. 
Church authority to discriminate in employing ministers 
in both pervasively sectarian and religiously-affiliated institu-
tions is undisputed. 12 Such decisions involve religious deter-
9. See infra note 14. 
10. This is a general proposition set forth by Oliver Thomas, former counsel to 
the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs and an Adjunct Professor of Law at 
Georgetown University Law Center. Thomas' views regarding the application of 
anti-discrimination laws to religious institutions were first presented to the ABA 
Conference on Religion in Public Life, University of Pennsylvania, May 31, 1991 
and were subsequently printed in the Journal of the National Administrative Law 
Judges. 
Because this comment argues that both religiously-affiliated and pervasively 
sectarian institutions should be subject to anti-discrimination law, less emphasis 
will be placed on the nature of the institution. 
11. Oliver s. Thomas, The Application of Anti-Discrimination Laws to Religious 
Institutions: The Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Object, 12 J. NATL Assoc. 
ADMIN. LAw JUDGES 83 (1992). For the purposes of this note, the author will use 
the terms "sectarian" and "religious" interchangeably. 
12. The proposition that such decisions lie beyond the jurisdiction of civil 
3
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minations which lie at the "core" of church doctrine, and thus, 
all courts agree that these decisions are covered by the church 
autonomy doctrine. 13 The courts' position with respect to non-
ministerial functions, however, remains unclear. In general, 
federal courts reviewing employment decisions at this level 
continue to resort to case-by-case analysis of the particular 
facts at hand. In the absence of any meaningful guidelines 
from the Supreme Court, lower courts, which must determine 
the religious nature of an employee's position, must rely upon 
standards set by previous courts grappling with this issue. 
This method of resolving discrimination disputes has led courts 
to reach different conclusions on ostensibly similar facts.14 
Given the need for a coherent policy in this area, courts 
should look to the recent line of federal cases which apply Title 
VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (hereinaf-
ter "ADEA")15 to employment discrimination disputes. 16 
These decisions, along with the strong policy arguments 
against gender discrimination, mandate that both religiously-
affiliated and pervasively sectarian institutions cannot justify 
sex discrimination with respect to employees who perform non-
courts finds ample support in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 
426 U.S. 696 (1976), and remains uncontested by federal courts as well as propo-
nents of the application of anti-discrimination law to religious institutions. In 
Milivojevich, the Court addressed the decision of the Mother Church of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia to suspend and defrock Bishop Milivojevich. [d. at 
697-98. The Illinois Supreme Court had ordered reinstatement of the Bishop based 
upon its finding that the Church had failed to comply with prescribed Church 
procedure. [d. at 698. The Supreme Court, in a seven-to-two vote, reversed and 
determined that the decision by the Illinois Court, to substitute its interpretation 
of the Church's doctrine for that of the Church itself, represented an impermissible 
encroachment of civil authority into ecclesiastical law. [d. at 720. 
13. See McClure, 460 F.2d 553 (holding that "the relationship between an orga-
nized church and its ministers is its lifeblood."). 
14. Compare Dayton Christian Schs. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 578 F.Supp. 
1004 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (holding that Commission is precluded by the First Amend-
ment from reviewing sex discrimination claim of parochial school teacher) with 
Welter v. Seton Hall Univ., 608 A.2d 206 (N.J. 1992) (holding that investigative 
review of discrimination claim by four nuns against parochial school did not vio-
late the Free Exercise Clause) and EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (holding that mandatory compliance with investigative review of a dis-
crimination 
claim by a potential female employee did not violate the Free Exercise Clause or 
the Establishment Clause). 
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988). 
16. See infra note 28 listing federal cases. 
4
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ministerial functions. 17 Such a judicial policy not only sur-
vives scrutiny under First Amendment principles, but is con-
sistent with recent federal decisions concerning church autono-
my. 
This comment will first demonstrate that compliance with 
Title VII at the non-ministerial level does not infringe upon 
the Free Exercise rights of a religious institution absent specif-
ic doctrinal authority within the institution compelling discrim-
ination at that leve1. 18 This comment will next argue that not 
only does the Establishment Clause permit compliance with 
Title VII, but allowing religious institutions to avoid Title VII 
requirements contradicts the non-establishment principle 
which the clause itself prohibits. 19 Finally, this comment will 
argue that principles of church autonomy do not constrain 
judicial resolution of employment disputes under Title VII, 
because such disputes represent essentially secular rather 
than ecclesiastical controversies.20 
17. A related topic to the one discussed involves those incidents in which non-
ministerial employees are discriminated against based on religion and indirectly on 
gender. For instance, an issue might arise in which a single woman employed by 
a church in a non-ministerial capacity is found to have committed a religious 
violation, i.e. becoming pregnant or having an abortion, which is uniquely gender-
based as well. If she is fired on the basis of her religious violation, an interesting 
issue is whether given the unique nature of her violation, Title VII should allow 
her to sue the church for wrongful termination on the basis of gender. Although 
this presents a complicated issue which lies beyond the scope of this paper, it is 
the author's opinion that a Title VII claim would not be appropriate under such 
circumstances. Where the employee has agreed to follow the religious doctrine in 
issue, it would seem that the church's Free Exercise right to demand adherence to 
official doctrine would, despite competing Title VII mandates, be seriously jeopar-
dized if those who purport to follow or in any way carry out that religious doc-
trine are 
permitted to challenge it on civil grounds when they violate that doctrine. 
18. See supra notes 21-103 and accompanying text discussing the Free Exercise 
Clause. 
19. See supra notes 104-160 and accompanying text discussing the Establish-
ment Clause. 
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II. FREE EXERCISE ANALYSIS 
The Free Exercise Clause21 ensures that those who hold 
religious beliefs are not impermissibly burdened by govern-
ment regulation in the exercise of those beliefs. This right to 
remain free of state interference applies not only to beliefs, but 
extends to religious conduct as well. 22 The relevance of this 
"belief-action" distinction to the employment context is clear: a 
belief which presumes inferior status and capability of women 
is hollow unless it is translated into practice by denying wom-
en access to positions commensurate with men. While the Free 
Exercise Clause governs such practice, it is not clear that it 
protects it. 
In applying anti-discrimination laws such as Title VII to 
religious authorities under the traditional Free Exercise test 
crafted by the Supreme Court, courts may consider: first, the 
magnitude of the statute's burden upon the exercise of the 
religious belief; second, the possible existence of a compelling 
state interest justifying the burden imposed; and finally, the 
extent to which recognition of an exemption from the statute 
would impede the objectives sought to be advanced by the 
state.23 Such an analysis demonstrates that holding religious 
institutions accountable for gender discrimination at the non-
ministerial level does not run afoul of their Free Exercise 
rights; to the contrary, because churches in the vast majority 
21. u.s. CONST. amend. I. 
22. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Yoder involved a claim by 
the Amish parents of elementary-aged children that Wisconsin's compulsory school-
attendance statute abridged their Free Exercise right to educate their children in 
a manner consistent with their religious beliefs. [d. at 207. Holding in favor of the 
parents, the Court recognized that the guarantee of Free Exercise was a shallow 
freedom absent the right to engage in religious conduct. [d. at 219-20. 
23. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-10 (1963). At issue in Sherbert was 
the right of state law to deny unemployment compensation to a Seventh-Day 
Adventist who failed to obtain employment because of her religiously-motivated 
refusal to work on Saturday. [d. at 399-402. The Court recognized that the effect 
of the state law was to force the individual to make a cruel choice between forego-
ing government benefits or violating her religious beliefs. [d. at 404. The Court 
thus held the statute invalid, reasoning that a state statute which seeks to ad-
vance legitimate secular goals is required to use the least-restrictive means avail-
able for achieving its legislative goal. [d. at 407. In this case, the Court deter-
mined that exemption from the statute for religiously-compelled refusal to work 
presented such an alternative. [d. at 408-409. 
6
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of cases cannot defend such practice on religious grounds, 
requiring them to use non-discriminatory criteria imposes 
little, if any, burden on their actual beliefs. 
A. DETERMINING WHETHER APPLICATION OF TITLE VII 
IMPERMISIBLY BURDENS FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 
To determine the magnitude of the burden imposed by 
anti-discrimination laws at the nonministerial level, courts 
must address two interrelated inquiries: whether sex discrimi-
nation at the non-ministerial level may be justified on religious 
grounds, and, if so, the extent to which the religious purpose of 
an institution will be undermined if it is forced to accommo-
date Title VII objectives.24 Because the Supreme Court has 
not directly addressed this issue, however, the most useful 
guidelines for addressing such inquiries appear in recent lower 
federal court decisions. 
1. The "Church-Minister" Exception To Application Of Title 
VII Under McClure 
The Fifth Circuit's decision in McClure v. Salvation Ar-
my25 is particularly instructive on the magnitude of the bur-
den imposed by anti-discrimination laws at the nonministerial 
level because it established the standards for determining 
which religious entities and employment positions should be 
exempted from Title VII strictures. In McClure the Fifth Cir-
cuit reviewed a sex discrimination claim of a female officer 
employed by the Salvation Army.26 Alleging a Title VII viola-
tion, the officer sought review of unequal wage compensation 
and her subsequent discharge after reporting the unequal 
payment.27 In an opinion which influenced a significant line of 
case law,28 the Fifth Circuit denied review of unequal wage 
24. The first of these inquiries reflects the statutory exemption principles of 42 
u.s.c. § 2000e-1(a) which exempts religiously motivated discriminatory conduct. 
The second inquiry reflects the extent to which compliance with Title VII would 
result in an impermissible burden on the Free Exercise rights of the religious 
institution involved. 
25. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972). 
26. McClure, 460 F.2d at 555. 
27. Id. 
28. The far-reaching significance of McClure is demonstrated by the progeny of 
7
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compensation.29 Concluding that the Salvation Army was a 
religious association, the court relied upon Free Exercise prin-
ciples to carve out a "church-minister" exception to Title VII.30 
The court identified the "church-minister" relationship as rep-
resenting the "lifeblood" of the church; thus, any attempt to 
resolve the present employment dispute would be an impermis-
sible intrusion into a "prime ecclesiastical concern.,,31 Because 
the officer's duties included clergy-like responsibilities, her 
position fell within the exception.32 
Following McClure, a substantial number of federal and 
state courts have similarly approached employment discrimina-
tion disputes by first determining whether the institution is so 
pervasively sectarian as to be classified a "church" and then 
determining whether the nature of the employment position is 
sufficiently related to "core" religious doctrine so as to justify 
discrimination.33 Where the employee's position advances an 
institution's religious mission, it is more likely to be covered by 
the exception.34 
The language in McClure strictly forbids judicial encroach-
ment into religious matters.35 Thus it would appear that 
courts would refrain from entertaining doubts regarding an 
employees' functions and resolve ambiguous issues in favor of 
cases using the McClure "church-minister" exception to resolve employment-related 
disputes. Cases following the McClure approach include EEOC v. Pacific Press 
Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); 
EEOC v. Fremont Christian School, 609 F.Supp. 344 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Russell v. 
Belmont College, 554 F.Supp. 667 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); Dolter v. Walhert High 
School, 483 F.Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980); Whatney v. Greater New York Corp of 
Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F.Supp. 1363 (S.D. N.Y. 1975); Marshall v. Pacific 
Union Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 7806 
(C.D. Cal. 1977). 
29. [d. at 560-61. 
30. [d. at 560. 
31. [d. at 558-59. 
32. See id. at 555, 560. 
33. See, e.g., EEOC v. Pac. Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 
1982); EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 609 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Dolter 
v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980); Russell v. Belmont 
College, 554 F. Supp. 667 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); Whitney v. Greater New York Corp. 
of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
34. See, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 
(1976). 
35. See McClure, 460 F.2d at 559-60. 
8
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the church. The tendency in the federal courts, however, has 
been to adopt a restrictive interpretation of what constitutes 
"ministerial functions."36 This interpretation demonstrates the 
courts' unwillingness to permit both religiously-affiliated and 
pervasively sectarian institutions fail to overcome even the 
initial hurdle of the Free Exercise test. 
2. Narrow Construction Of The "Church-Minister" Exception 
Soon after the McClure37 decision, the Fifth Circuit once 
again confronted the application of anti-discrimination laws to 
a religious entity in EEOC u. Southwestern Baptist Theological 
Seminary.3s In Southwestern Baptist, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC") sued to enforce 
the Seminary's compliance with the Commission's reporting 
requirements.39 The Seminary had resisted on the grounds 
that the reports sought by the EEOC concerned employees who 
fell under the church-minister exception.40 Finding the semi-
nary to be a "church" for McClure purposes, the court never-
theless rejected the Seminary's argument.41 
The Fifth Circuit demonstrated how narrowly it was will-
ing to construe the "ministerial" exception when it held that 
maintenance and plant employees were not encompassed by 
the exception even though four of these staff members were 
actually ordained ministers.42 Because its employees were ex-
cluded from the "church-minister" exception, the Seminary 
36. See, e.g., EEOC v. Pac. Press Publishing Ass'n., 676 F.2d 1272; EEOC v. 
Fremont Christian Sch., 609 F. Supp. 344; Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. 
Supp. 266; Russell v. Belmont College, 554 F. Supp. 667. 
37. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553. 
38. 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982). 
39. [d. at 277. 
40. [d. at 281-82. 
41. [d. at 283. 
42. [d. at 283-85. The court's narrow construction of the McClure approach is 
demonstrated by its reasoning that, "those administrators whose function relates 
exclusively to the Seminary's finance, maintenance, and other non-acadelnic depart-
ment, though ordained lninisters by the Seminary, are not ministers as we used 
that label in McClure . ... ' [d. at 285. Significantly, the Fifth Circuit went on to 
explain that, "when churches expand their operations beyond the traditional func-
tions essential to the propagation of their donctrine, those employed to perform 
tasks which are not traditionally ecclesiastical or religious are not 'ministers' of a 
'church' entitled to McClure-type protection." [d. 
9
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could resist compliance with the reporting requirements only if 
it could demonstrate that the burden imposed by the require-
ments would inhibit the exercise of their religious beliefs.43 
Employing the tripartite Free Exercise test, the court in 
Southwestern Baptist determined that no such burden exist-
ed.44 Dispositive of the court's holding was the fact that the 
Seminary did not hold any religious tenet which required gen-
der discrimination regarding the employee positions at is-
sue.45 The court thus reasoned that, because "the relevant 
inquiry is not the impact of the statute upon the institution, 
but . .. upon the institution's exercise of its sincerely held 
beliefs, ,,46 application of Title VII reporting requirements did 
not impose an impermissible burden for Free Exercise purpos-
es.47 
Only one year later, the Ninth Circuit confronted a sex 
discrimination challenge lodged against a publishing associa-
tion in EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n.48 On facts 
similar to McClure, a female employee charged her former 
employer, a church-affiliated publishing house, of unequal pay-
ment of similarly situated male and female employees.49 
Despite its affiliation with the Seventh Day Adventist 
Church, and the fact that it published only religious materials, 
the Ninth Circuit found that the publishing house did not 
constitute a "church" for McClure purposes. 50 Moreover, the 
employee's position as editorial secretary did not "go to the 
43. [d. at 286-87. 
44. [d. at 285-87. 
45. [d. at 286 ("Since the Seminary does not hold any religious tenet that re-
quires discrimination on the basis of sex, ... the application of Title VII report-
ing requirements to it does not directly burden the exercise of any sincerely held 
religious belief."). 
46. [d. at 286 n.8 (quoting EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 488 
(5th Cir. 1980). 
47. [d. 
48. 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982). 
49. [d. at 1274. 
50. [d. at 1281. In determining the sectarian nature of the publishing house, 
the court used the standards established earlier in Southwestern Baptist. In com-
paring the publishing house to the seminary in Southwestern Baptist, it found 
that, "Press' character and purpose clearly are somewhat less sectarian than those 
of a seminary." [d. at 1282. 
10
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heart of the church's function in the manner of a minister or 
seminary teacher.,,51 This was true even though she held both 
administrative and discretionary responsibilities as editor of 
the religious magazine.52 
In disposing of the publishing house's Free Exercise chal-
lenge, the court concluded that "enforcement of Title VII's 
equal pay provision does not and could not conflict with 
Adventist religious doctrines .... ,,53 The court based this con-
clusion on the fact that the Church could point to no religious 
tenets allowing wage discrimination on the basis of sex. 54 
Thus, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, "preventing discrimination 
could have no significant impact upon the exercise of Adventist 
belief."55 
3. State Adoption Of The McClure Doctrine 
Most recently, in 1992, the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
reaffirmed the viability of the McClure approach to resolving 
employment disputes over gender. In Welter v. Seton Hall 
University,56 the Court upheld a jury award of $45,000 in 
compensatory damages to four nuns who were unfairly dis-
missed by a religiously-affiliated university.57 The university 
had defended its decision to terminate the nuns' teaching con-
tracts based on an order of the Roman Catholic Church which 
required the nuns to return to their covenant in Toledo, 
Ohio.58 The University admitted that firing the women violat-
ed their employment contracts, but argued that their decision 
was nevertheless motivated by religious concerns. 59 
In rejecting the University's assertion, the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey found the reason advanced by the University to 
51. [d. at 1278. 
52. See id. at 1277. 
53. [d. at 1279. 
54. [d. 
55. [d. 
56. 608 A.2d 206 (N.J. 1992). 
57. [d. at 208. 
58. [d. at 208-09. 
59. [d. at 209. 
11
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be pretextua1.60 Moreover, while the court acknowledged the 
authority of the University to designate persons as ministers 
free from governmental interference, it adopted Fifth Circuit 
reasoning that ''bestowal of such a designation does not control 
[an institution's] extra-religious legal status."61 Thus, finding 
that the nuns "performed no ministerial duties for Seton 
Hall,,,62 the Welter Court decided that the University must be 
judged similar to any other employer who engaged in unlawful 
discrimination in violation of Title VII. 63 
Because the employment contracts did not contain any 
canons of the Roman Catholic faith, the court in Welter did not 
have to reach the issue of whether the Catholic faith actually 
motivated the University's behavior.64 The court hinted at the 
outcome, however, when it observed that, "although the sincer-
ity of a religious institution's belief may relate to a Court's 
decision whether to grant a First Amendment-based exemption 
from neutral and involuntary regulation, it rarely disposes of a 
Free Exercise challenge to voluntarily assumed contractual 
obligations.,,65 
In this sense, the Welter Court took application of anti-
discrimination law a step further than the federal courts; even 
if religious beliefs condoned the University's behavior, the 
court nonetheless would allow their civil, contractual obliga-
tions to govern.66 Notwithstanding the controversial nature of 
this idea, the Welter decision demonstrates the willingness of 
both federal and state courts to hold religious employers liable 
for discriminatory conduct that cannot be justified on religious 
grounds. 
60. [d. at 216. 
61. Welter, 608 A.2d at 215 (quoting Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 283). 
62. [d. 
63. [d. 
64. See id. at 217. 
65. [d. at 217 (internal citations omitted). 
66. [d. 
12
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4. The Minimal Burden Of Compliance With Title VII On Free 
Exercise 
While claimants in Title VII cases have not been uniformly 
successful,67 the modern tendency of federal courts is to deny 
efforts by religious entities to justify discriminatory employ-
ment decisions on religious grounds. In those federal and state 
courts which follow McClure, this approach has significant 
legal implications for churches claiming exemption under the 
initial inquiry of Free Exercise test. First, the narrow view 
taken by courts of "ministerial" functions indicates that a wide 
range of employment positions thought to be beyond the ambit 
of judicial resolution in fact lie within the courts' jurisdiction. 
Moreover, federal courts' use of the McClure test in determin-
ing what constitutes a "church" demonstrates that even perva-
sively sectarian institutions may be subject to judicial review. 
The practical consequence of finding that gender discrimina-
tion by a church is unsupported by religious doctrine at the 
non-ministerial level means that application of anti-discrim-
ination laws is not only justified, but critical to ensuring the 
fair treatment of women in all facets of the employment con-
text that can be reached without violating the Free Exercise 
Clause. 
More fundamentally, the legal consequence of applying 
Title VII to employment decisions is that the less able a church 
is to defend sex discrimination on religious grounds, the more 
likely it is that any burden on its overall exercise of beliefs will 
be regarded as minimal. Along the same lines, it is important 
to note that the adoption by the majority of federal courts of a 
narrow view of ministerial function manifests their disapproval 
67. See, e.g., Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991). In Wuerl, a Prot-
estant school teacher contested the non-renewal of her teaching contract by her 
Catholic Church employer. [d. at 945. The Church's decision was based upon its 
belief that Little violated core religious doctrine when she remarried without pur-
suing the prescribed process available from the Roman Catholic Church for vali-
dating the marriage. [d. at 945-46. Although the Third Circuit acknowledged the 
issues of religious and gender discrimination at state, it nonetheless construed the 
Title VII exemption for religiously-motivated discrimination broadly to encompass 
employee performance of both "religious activities" as well as indirect religious 
functions. [d. at 950. The court thus held in favor of the Church, citing both Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clause justifications for its decision. [d. at 951. 
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of the practice of gender discrimination. The approach under 
McClure could easily have resolved ambiguities regarding the 
nature of the employment position in favor of the religious 
authority. However, as the decision in Southwestern Baptist 
proves, courts are willing to overlook even the fact that an 
employee is ordained as a minister if doing so permits the 
state to supervise a greater number of employment decisions. 
Moreover, as courts increasingly come to view sex discrimina-
tion as intolerable, the United States Supreme Court will have 
difficulty justifying its current neutral stance towards the 
mounting importance of this issue. 
B. DETERMINING WHETHER A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST 
EXISTS WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE MINIMAL BURDEN ON 
FREE EXERCISE 
1. Supreme Court Recognition of State Interest In Eliminating 
Invidious Forms of Discrimination 
In evaluating Free Exercise challenges, courts often utilize 
a "balancing test" in which the magnitude of the burden on 
Free Exercise is weighed against the state's justification in 
regulation.68 Historically, only those state interests deemed to 
be "of highest order" have withstood Constitutional scrutiny 
when they are found to burden free exercise rights.69 Reliance 
68. This test originated in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-10 (1963); see 
supra note 23 discussing Sherbert. 
69. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
In Thomas, the Court was asked to rule on the validity of a law denying unem-
ployment compensation to a Jehovah's Witness who quit his job due to religious 
conflict when his employer assigned him to work on military weaponry. [d. at 709. 
The argument against allowing him to recover compensation was the state man-
date which routinely denied benefits to any person voluntarily leaving a job "with-
out good cause [arising] in connection with [his] work." [d. at 712. The Indiana 
Supreme Court had found that no undue burden would be imposed in Thomas' 
Free Exercise rights if he were forced to comply with the state law. [d. at 713. It 
further held that ruling in Thomas' favor would effectively violate the Establish-
ment Clause. In an eight-to-one opinion, the Supreme Court reversed both find-
ings. Chief Justice Burger confirmed its prior ruling in Sherbert stating that 
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit 
upon conductproscribed by a religious faith, or where it 
denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by 
religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an 
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, 
a burden on religion exists. 
14
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on this standard has led the United States Supreme Court to 
strike down conduct, otherwise protected by the First Amend-
ment, which poses a substantial threat to public safety, peace 
and order.70 Moreover, the Court has found "certain govern-
ment interests so compelling as to allow even regulations pro-
hibiting religiously based conduct."71 
A good example of the type of state interest the Court 
considers sufficiently compelling to override a Free Exercise 
claim is demonstrated in Bob Jones University v. United 
States.72 In Bob Jones, the Court reviewed a state decision 
denying tax-exempt status to a university that discriminated 
in its selection procedures on basis of race.73 Recognizing "the 
overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in edu-
cation," the Court upheld the state action, finding no First 
Amendment violation.74 
In 1984, the Supreme Court extended its policy of eradi-
cating invidious discrimination when it denied the right of a 
private organization to discriminate its membership on the 
basis of sex. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,75 the Court 
considered the constitutionality of subjecting a non-profit na-
tional organization to State anti-discrimination law.76 The 
First Amendment rights of free speech and association were at 
issue. 
In an opinion notable for its candor, the Court recognized 
the magnitude of its holding by stating: "There can be no clear-
er example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs 
[d. at 717-18. In addressing the Establishment Clause issue, Chief Justice Burger 
quoted directly from Sherbert in finding that payment of benefits represented "the 
governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences. . . . » [d. 
at 720 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409). 
70. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). 
71. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983). 
72. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
73. [d. at 577. Based on its belief that the Bible forbids interracial dating and 
marriage, the University completely denied admission to Blacks until 1971. [d. at 
580. Although the University repealed this policy, its revised policy permitted only 
blacks married within their race to apply. [d. 
74. [d. at 604. 
75. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
76. [d. at 614-15. 
15
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of an association than a regulation that forces the group to 
accept members it does not desire."77 Nonetheless, the Court 
found the state interest in eliminating gender discrimination to 
be "of highest order," and the abridgment of speech and asso-
ciation rights incidental. 78 This was true even though impos-
ing the regulation might "impair the ability of the original 
members to express only those views that brought them to-
gether.,,79 
Critical to the Court's holding in Roberts was its determi-
nation that the club's objective to foster the development of 
young men's civic organizations would not be undermined if 
they were forced to admit women.80 Using language strikingly 
similar to that of lower federal courts, the Roberts Court ar-
ticulated a test for balancing the club's right of expressive 
association against the state interest in regulation.81 Under 
this test, a club's expressive association right is not overridden 
by the competing interest in eradicating unlawful discrimina-
tion when that interest does not impede the ability of the club 
to express its ideals.82 
Put another way, if membership in a particular organiza-
tion is not conditioned upon adherence to a philosophy of sex 
discrimination, that organization cannot posit its belief in that 
philosophy as a justification for resisting state regulation of 
gender discrimination. Thus, it would appear that, at the time 
the Supreme Court was developing the constitutional frame-
work for judging gender discrimination by private associations, 
its reasoning was being applied simultaneously by the lower 
federal courts against religious institutions. 
77. [d. at 623. 
78. [d. at 623-24 ("We are persuaded that Minnesota's compelling interest in 
eradicating discrimination against its female citizens justifies the impact that ap-
plication of the statute to the Jaycees may have on the male members' 
associational freedoms."). 
79. [d. at 623. 
80. See id. at 624-25. 
81. [d. at 627. 
82. [d. 
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2. Legal Implications Of Bob Jones And Roberts: Regulating 
Discriminatory Conduct By Religious Institutions 
The Supreme Court's disposition in Bob Jones83 and Rob-
erts84 has profound legal significance for the present dispute; 
to the extent that religious organizations cannot advance reli-
gious justifications for discriminating against women at the 
non-ministerial level, the state interest in providing equal 
access to those positions for men and women should outweigh 
the burden imposed by forcing compliance. Moreover, even 
when religious justification does exist, the Court's constitution-
al jurisprudence with respect to sex discrimination renders 
Free Exercise arguments equally unpersuasive. 
Bob Jones makes clear that in some instances even reli-
gious conduct may be regulated,85 while Roberts establishes 
that eliminating gender discrimination constitutes a state 
interest of the highest importance.86 Taken together, these 
cases stand for the proposition that the Free Exercise right to 
discriminate against women at the non-ministerial level may 
be overridden even when exercising that right is mandated by 
religious doctrine. Moreover, the fact that a church discrimi-
nates, as opposed to a private organization, does not change 
the analysis. On the contrary, as the federal cases demon-
strate, even those institutions which are so pervasively sectari-
an that they resemble a church are not exempt from civil lia-
bility when they discriminate in an unlawful manner.87 Given 
the combined logic of the Supreme Court's and the lower feder-
al courts' decisions, attempts by religious institutions to justify 
sex discrimination outside of those employees actually perform-
ing ministerial functions are unlikely to survive the Free Exer-
cise "balancing" test even when the state interest is judged 
against the strictest standards used by the Supreme Court 
thus far. 
83. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
84. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
85. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text discussing Bob Jones. 
86. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text discussing Roberts. 
87. See EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 
(5th Cir. 1981); see supra notes 38-47 discussing Southwestern Baptist. 
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c. RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION FROM TITLE VII As .AN OBSTACLE 
To THE ELIMINATION OF INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION 
The final consideration of the Free Exercise test examines 
implementing the state objective. Sherbert requires that the 
regulation be the least restrictive means of accomplishing the 
state objective and that the state objective be compelling.ss If 
the state objective is sufficiently compelling, and exemption 
from the regulation would undermine that objective, religious 
authorities may be forced to comply with state regulation.s9 
In the employment context, efforts to end unjust sex dis-
crimination will be wholly unsuccessful if the church retains 
absolute discretion in choosing employees for non-ministerial 
functions. The incompatibility between such discretion and the 
state objective in eradicating unlawful discrimination is most 
clear when that interest is broken down into its two respective 
parts: the societal and the individual interest.9o 
1. Societal Interests In Regulating Potentially Discriminatory 
Employment Decisions By Religious Institutions 
A key state interest in regulating gender discrimination is 
the elimination of impermissible and unnecessary discrimina-
tion at all levels of employment. The nature of the social inter-
est is such that the larger the segment of the population in-
volved, the more important it is that access to these positions 
is not unduly restricted. When society permits churches to 
discriminate in the selection of ministers, it is recognizing that 
the right to choose religious leaders is distinct from other em-
ployment choices. Such decisions underlie the institution itself, 
and thus, "the perpetuation of a church's existence may depend 
upon those whom it selects to preach its values, teach its mes-
88. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). 
89. [d. at 406-07. 
90. See Mark F. Kohler, Equal Employment or Excessive Entanglement? The 
Application Of Employment Discrimination Statutes To Religiously Affiliated Orga-
nizations 18 CONN. L. REV. 581, 612-14 (1986) in which the author similarly ana-
lyzes the state interest in employment discrimination statutes at the societal and 
individual level. 
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sage, and interpret its doctrines both to its membership and 
the world at large.,,91 
Conversely, the more attenuated a particular position is 
from the "core" of spiritual beliefs, the greater the state inter-
est in regulating it.92 This interest reflects the fact that the 
fewer religious duties involved, the less likely they are to ad-
vance the religious mission of the institution.93 Similarly, the 
less a position involves the performance of religious responsi-
bilities, the more likely it is that a broad segment of the popu-
lation are qualified to fulfill it. Permitting religious institutions 
to discriminate at the non-ministerial level thus directly im-
pedes the ability of the state to ensure that the individuals 
chosen for these positions are selected according to nondiscrim-
inatory criteria. 
2. Individual Interests In RegUlating Potentially 
Discriminatory Employment Decisions By Religious 
Institutions 
The second facet of the state interest involved in regulat-
ing church employment decisions is in providing a legal reme-
dy for the individual employee who is injured by unlawful 
discrimination.94 Indeed, Title VII itself outlines the proce-
dures by which individuals may initiate proceedings against 
their employers.95 Furthermore, the statutory remedies of re-
instatement and back pay are available only to individuals. 
When c<?urts overlook the importance of such remedies, they 
ultimately undermine the state objective in eliminating unfair 
discrimination. 
91. Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 
1168 (4th Cir. 1985). The Rayburn decision addressed the issue of Title VII's ap-
plication to sexual discrimination in pastoral hiring. Carole Rayburn brought the 
complaint against the Seventh-Day Adventist Church following its denial of her 
request for employment as an associate in pastoral care. See id. at 1165. Affirming 
the district court, the Fourth Circuit held that state scrutiny of Rayburn's claim 
would constitute both significant infringement on the Church's Free Exercise 
rights, as well as impermissible entanglement with its religious doctrine. Id. at 
1171. 
92. See Kohler, supra note 90, at 615. 
93. Id. 
94. See Kohler, supra note 90, at 613. 
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988). 
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A primary example of this tendency is the Sixth Circuit's 
1985 decision in Dayton Christian Schs. v. Ohio Civil Rights 
Comm'n.96 In Dayton, the court reviewed a sex discrimination 
claim by a school teacher dismissed from her teaching position 
shortly after becoming pregnant.97 Although a state statute 
made it unlawful for "any employer ... to discharge without 
just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate [on 
the basis of sex],,,98 the Sixth Circuit declined to apply this 
statute to the school's actions.99 This action had the practical 
effect of dismissing the teacher's claim. Although the court 
identified the state interest in eliminating sex discrimination 
from employment as "substantial and compelling," it found 
that this state interest did not outweigh the burden on the 
school's Free Exercise right to dismiss its own employees. loo 
Moreover, the court estimated that the denial of tax exemp-
tions and other public programs to the school represented less 
burdensome means of accommodating that state interest. lOl 
By declining to review the individual sex discrimination charge 
at issue, the Dayton Court completely disregarded the individ-
ual interest at stake. Although the Sixth Circuit was later 
reversed on appeal, the Supreme Court merely reversed on 
procedural grounds, never addressing the merits of the 
teacher's claim.l02 
3. The Legal And Practical Implications Of Denying Societal 
And Individual Interests In Ending Discrimination 
Indeed, an issue frequently overlooked by courts and com-
mentators alike, is the way in which judicial indifference to 
individual remedies undermines the larger social incentive. 103 
96. 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985). 
97. Id. at 934-35. 
98. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02 (Supp. 1985). 
99. Dayton 766 F.2d at 961. 
100. Id. at 953-56. 
101. Id. at 955. 
102. See Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n., 477 U.S. 619 
(1986). 
103. As one observer complained of the ruling in Dayton Christian Sch. v. Ohio 
Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985), "the decision grossly under-
estimated the magnitude of the combined societal and individual state interest and 
the degree to which the accommodation of the school's free exercise would under-
mine [that] interest." See Kohler, supra note 90 at 614. 
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Deprivation of individual rights in the face of clear discrimina-
tion indirectly discourages others from bringing equally legiti-
mate claims. Without these subsequent claims, the state objec-
tive in ending discrimination is not merely disabled, but is 
made legally impossible. Most importantly, in overlooking the 
combined impact of individual and social remedies, the Dayton 
decision makes the exercise of a religious right more important 
than both. In focusing exclusively upon the larger social inter-
est in eliminating gender discrimination, it provides the vehi-
cle by which a religious entity may, in certain circumstances, 
use their religious liberty to oppress individual rights. Such a 
result not only lacks support in language of the First Amend-
ment Free Exercise Clause, but is repugnant to the Constitu-
tion itself. 
III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS 
Unlike the Free Exercise Clause, which rests on notions 
about deference to religious liberty, the Establishment 
Clause104 speaks more to the neutral stance taken by both 
religion and government with respect to each other. Specifical-
ly, the Establishment Clause forbids "sponsorship, financial 
support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious 
activity."105 Because most Establishment Clause claims con-
cern challenges to government aid, the Supreme Court crafted 
a tripartite test to determine parameters of state involvement: 
first, a state law must have a secular purpose; second, it must 
have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion; and finally, it must not foster excessive entanglement be-
tween government and religion. lOG 
104. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
105. Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). The Court in Walz ad-
dressed the legality of tax exemptions for property used by religious organizations 
for worship. Concerned about the potential for "excessive entanglement," the Court 
found the tax exemptions to be constitutional. [d. at 667-80. The Walz Court's 
main basis for concern was the manner in which the elimination of the tax ex-
emption might embroil government officials in litigation against the churches re-
garding default on tax obligations. The Court thus concluded that such potential 
litigation Rosed the requisite level of "ongoing and continuous surveillance" leading 
to an impermissible degree of entanglement. 
106. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon involved the Court's re-
view of two state programs which involved state funded salary payments to paro-
chial school teachers of students from low socio-economic backgrounds. Chief Jus-
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A. THE ENTANGLEMENT PRONG 
When considering the application of anti-discrimination to 
religious institutions, it is the third prong which is most often 
implicated and on which opponents of application tend to rely. 
One commentator has argued that non-entanglement princi-
ples of the Establishment Clause lend substantial theoretical 
protection to churches who base their right to discriminate on 
religious doctrine. 107 An analysis of the Supreme Court's ju-
risprudence with respect to entanglement reveals, however, 
that such claims misapprehend the entanglement issues in-
volved in the employment discrimination context. 
Past Supreme Court holdings indicate that when religious 
entities engage in commercial activity, some measure of regu-
latory oversight is permitted. lOB As one might expect, in those 
instances where the Court has sanctioned such involvement, it 
has done so by finding that the regulation at hand ''bear[s] no 
resemblance to the kind of government surveillance the Court 
has previously held to pose an intolerable risk of government 
entanglement with religion."109 
In 1990, in Jimmy Swaggert Ministries v. Board of Equal-
tice Burger struck down both programs as violating the excessive entanglement 
prong of the Establishment Clause. [d. at 625. Under the programs, the state aid 
was to be given only to the secular functions within each program. [d. at 606-607. 
This situation, in the Court's opinion, fostered continued government surveillance 
over the school in order to guarantee that the funds were being properly allocated. 
Id. at 618. The Court concluded that such interaction between parochial schools 
and civil authority ran counter to established principles of separation within the 
Establishment Clause. [d. 
107. Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference 
with Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1984). 
108. See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggert Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California, 
493 U.S. 378 (1990); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Tony and 
Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985). 
109. Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation, 471 U.S. at 290. In Tony and Susan 
Alamo Foundation, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the minimum wage 
record keeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (hereinafter "FLSA") 
could constitutionally be applied to a religious foundation which engaged in the 
production of various goods to generate revenue. Id. at 305-06. In the Court's 
opinion, the FLSA reporting requirements did not impermissibly entangle the gov-
ernment with religion because the regulation was limited to the commercial activi-
ty of the foundation; it did not extend to the foundation's religious functions. Id. 
at 306. 
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ization of California,l1O the Court reaffirmed its position on 
non-entanglement when it upheld a state's denial of sales tax 
exemption to a religious organization whose funding was gen-
erated in part by the sale of religious material. 111 In 
Swaggert, the Court determined that because the organization 
had a sufficient nexus with the state, it could be required to 
collect and report its mail-order sales to California purchas-
ers.112 Critical to the Court's holding was the fact that impos-
ing the tax did not require the state to evaluate the religious 
content of material sold, but only the sale of that material, "a 
question which involves only secular determination."113 In its 
holding the Court thus reaffirmed the principle that "generally 
applicable administrative and record keeping regulations may 
be imposed on religious organizations without running afoul of 
the Establishment Clause.,,114 
1. Swaggert Guidelines And Permissive Entanglement 
The Swaggert1l5 decision is important for several rea-
sons. 116 First, Swaggert stands for the proposition that gener-
ally applicable legislation is favored over that which has the 
effect of curtailing religious liberty.1l7 Because churches could 
potentially qualify as employers for Title VII purposes, requir-
ing them to abide by its strictures is entirely consistent with 
the tenor and underlying policy of Swaggert which requires 
religious institutions to comply with generally applicable laws. 
This is particularly true when such religiOUS authorities are 
actually motivated by non-religious, rather than religious, 
factors. Furthermore, Swaggert demonstrates that the Su-
preme Court will permit some level of state entanglement with 
110. 493 U.S. 378 (1990). 
111. [d. at 395. 
112. [d. at 394-95. 
113. [d. at 396. 
114. [d. at 395 (quoting Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97 
(1989)). 
115. Jimmy Swaggert Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California, 493 U.S. 
378 (1990). 
116. See supra notes 108-119 and accompanying text discussing Swaggert. 
117. The Court's reasoning depends largely on its belief that California's sales 
tax does not discriminate against sales of religious materials. As the Court ex-
plains, "there is no danger that appellant's religious activity is being singled out 
for special and burdensome treatment." Swaggert, 493 U.S. at 390. 
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religious entities provided that such involvement is limited to 
regulating their secular activities. 118 
Finally, the concerns of the Swaggert Court set forth use-
ful guidelines for judging excessive entanglement in the em-
ployment context. In applying anti-discrimination laws, court 
must consider: first, whether the state is imposing a substan-
tial administrative burden on the institution; next, whether 
the proposed regulation involves detailed monitoring and close 
administrative contact with the institution; and finally, wheth-
er the state must inquire into religious doctrine of the institu-
tion in order to regulate its decisions. 119 
a. The Minimal Administrative Burden Under Title VII 
So long as employment decisions at the non-ministerial 
level are not justified by religious tenets, the state does not 
violate Free Exercise principles when it reviews those deci-
sions. 12o Similarly, requiring church compliance with state 
investigative procedures does not represent an impermissible 
administrative burden in violation of the Establishment 
Clause. Because charges of sex discrimination involve a limited 
and highly specific inquiry, the burden imposed on an institu-
tion defending against the charge is substantially less then 
that in Swaggert.121 Thus, it is not surprising that the majori-
ty of federal courts who permit regulation find the correspond-
ing burden to be minimal. 122 
In the 1980 decision of EEOC v. Mississippi College/23 
the EEOC had attempted to subpoena a university for records 
118. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
119. See Swaggert, 493 U.S. at 392-99. 
120. See supra notes 21-103 and accompanying text discussing the Free Exercise 
Clause. 
121. The sales tax in Swaggert extended to the daily operation of the religious 
organization in the sale of religious material. Swaggert, 493 U.S. at 379-80. By 
contrast, the highly specific nature of an employment descrimination claim would 
require an institution to defend a single employment decision or, at most, a partic-
ular employment practice at issue. 
122. See supra note 28. 
123. 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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regarding a hiring decision which passed over a qualified fe-
male employee.124 The University refused to comply with the 
order on the grounds that compliance would foster excessive 
entanglement in violation of the Establishment Clause. 125 
Recognizing that Title VII exempted only religious discrimina-
tion, and finding no religious tenet which sanctioned the 
university's conduct, the Fifth Circuit ordered the University to 
produce the documents. 126 The subpoena demanded a list of 
all staff members showing their name, race, sex, religion, job 
description, pay and educational level. 127 Information pertain-
ing to faculty recruiting and promotion, and access to all ad-
ministrative positions during the period in issue, were also 
required. 128 Despite the comprehensive nature of the investi-
gation, compliance with the procedure was held to be only 
minimally burdensome.129 
The same result was reached by the Fifth Circuit one year 
later in EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Semi-
nary/30 when the Court again reviewed the parameters of 
permissible regulation by the EEOC over religious institutions. 
Although the Seminary was not under investigation at the 
time, the Commission requested that the Seminary submit to 
biennial reporting requirements. 131 The Fifth Circuit recog-
nized that the compliance burden was more demanding than 
the burden which it upheld in Mississippi College. Neverthe-
less, it regarded the Seminary's complaints as "largely hypo-
thetical.,,132 Moreover, even though the regulation would be 
"ongoing" in a way which was not present in the previous case, 
the court determined that, ''because it is not an ongoing inter-
ference with the Seminary's religious practices," the adminis-
trative burden was "consequently minimal."133 Because the 
government sought "merely to gather statistical information" 
from the church, the court concluded that an even stronger 
124. Id. at 478. 
125. Id. at 480. 
126. Id. at 487-88. 
127. Id. 
128. EEOC, 626 F.2d at 480-81. 
129. Id. at 487. 
130. 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981). 
131. Id. at 279-80. 
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case for allowing regulation existed than in Mississippi Col-
lege. 134 
Although the decisions of the Fifth Circuit appear to go 
beyond the guidelines set forth in Swaggert, a factual compari-
son proves that the federal decisions are in fact entirely consis-
tent. In Swaggert, the Supreme Court found that the adminis-
trative and pecuniary burden did not rise to a "constitutionally 
significant level.,,135 Even though the administrative burden 
of submitting reports would continue on' a regular basis and 
the costs of collecting and remitting the tax amounted to more 
than $150,000. 136 Viewed against the facts of Swaggert, the 
burden imposed upon the religious institutions in Mississippi 
College and Southwestern Baptist can hardly be seen as com-
mensurate. Even when the nature of the compliance burden is 
ongoing, as in Southwestern Baptist, such regulation still com-
ports with the regulatory standards in Swaggert. More funda-
mentally, the burden imposed on religious entities engaged in 
gender discrimination is the same as that imposed on any 
other organization that discriminates unlawfully. Thus, in the 
absence of religious justification, such a result is entirely ap-
propriate under the Establishment Clause. 
b. Title VII's Avoidance Of Detailed Monitoring And Close 
Administrative Contact 
The Supreme Court's decision to allow government surveil-
lance in Swaggert 137 rested upon its belief that the imposition 
of the neutral tax law did not create an overly invasive level of 
contact between secular and religious authorities. 13B Specifi-
cally, the type of involvement prohibited by the state is "on-site 
continuous inspection of appellant's day-to-day operations."139 
According to the Swaggert Court, such involvement represents 
134. [d. 
135. Swaggert, 493 U.S. at 394. 
136. [d. at 382. 
137. 493 U.S. 378 (1990). 
138. See supra notes 108-119 and accompanying text discussing Swaggert. 
139. Swaggert, 493 U.S. at 395 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of 
N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970)). 
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the kind of "official and continuing surveillance" which 
impermissibly entangles government in religious affairs. l40 
Application of anti-discrimination laws to religious author-
ities successfully eschews this type of prohibited involvement. 
Insofar as church practices comport with the strictures of Title 
VII, their decisions remain wholly within their discretion, 
subject to investigative review only when an actual dispute 
arises. Courts struggling with the entanglement issue may 
thus rely, as did the Ninth Circuit,141 on the fact that EEOC 
actions must be initiated by an employee who files charges 
with the Commission. The EEOC itself lacks independent 
authority to initiate such actions or issue coercive orders to 
enforce Title VII. 142 
Furthermore, as the Court held in Swaggert, "routine 
regulatory interaction" between secular and religious bodies 
"does not of itself violate the non-entanglement command."I43 
Thus, if the collection of taxes and attendant record-keeping 
satisfies this command, it is difficult to see how entanglement 
is any more implicated by record-keeping of employment deci-
sions. On the contrary, because the supervisory authority of 
the state typically extends only to situations where an actual 
dispute arises, the potential for significant administrative 
contact is considerably less than that posed in Swaggert. Fed-
eral courts have adopted this exact reasoning in the most re-
cent decisions regarding church discrimination. 
In 1993, for example, the Second Circuit concluded that 
there was no impermissible contact in the review of an age 
discrimination challenge to a pervasively sectarian high 
school. l44 In DeMarco, a school teacher contested the 
140. [d. at 393. 
141. See EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(finding EEOC actions did not violate excessive entanglement concern of the Estab-
lishment Clause). 
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988) (recognizing only charges "filed by or on 
behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission"). 
143. Swaggert, 493 U.S. at 395 (quoting Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. at 696-
97). 
144. DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993). 
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nonrenewal of his teaching contract under the ADEA. 145 The 
school in turn argued that application of the ADEA to its em-
ployment decision violated the non-entanglement principle of 
the Establishment Clause by generating unwarranted inter-
ference with their labor relations policy.146 
Following a previous line of federal court decisions, the 
Second Circuit held that the "narrow focus of the ADEA" would 
not result in the type of "detailed monitoring and close admin-
istrative contact" prohibited under Hernandez v. Commission-
er.147 The court instead characterized the investigation as a 
limited inquiry because the sole question at issue was whether 
the teacher was unjustifiably treated differently because of his 
age. 148 The court cited Hernandez for the proposition that 
routine regulatory interaction is permitted under the Estab-
lishment Clause. 149 Application of the ADEA, in the court's 
opinion, "requires just such routine regulatory interaction 
between government and a religious institution."15o 
2. Title VII's Avoidance Of Inquiries Into Religious Doctrine 
Because the Establishment Clause mandates that the 
government assume a neutral stance with respect to religion, 
the most important concern of the Supreme Court in address-
ing employment regulation is that courts do not become em-
broiled in ecclesiastical disputes, or, as one commentator put 
it, "difficult classifications of what is or is not 'religious,' 'cor-
rect doctrine,' or 'worship"'.151 Some commentators argue that 
imposition of anti-discrimination law inescapably results in 
entanglement. 152 Such an argument, however, fails to com-
prehend that the essential nature of the employment dispute 
145. Id. at 168. 
146. Id. at 169. 
147. Id. at 170 (citing Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97 
(1989». 
148. Id. 
149. DeMarco, 4 F.3d at 170. 
150. Id. 
151. Esbeck, supra note 107, at 384-85. 
152. See id. at 387; Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion 
Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 
81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981). 
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remains the same regardless of the institution which discrimi-
nates. Even when a church is involved in the investigation, the 
precise issue-whether a particular employee was the victim of 
unlawful discrimination-is a procedural, rather than doctrin-
al, consideration. 
At the non-ministerial level, the vast majority of gender 
discrimination cannot be defended on religious grounds. 153 In 
these cases, a court reviewing a particular decision need not be 
familiar with particular religious faith at issue because evalua-
tion of the employer's motives resembles a secular determina-
tion. Thus, when a court applies anti-discrimination law to a 
religious entity, it is ensuring only that the process by which 
men and women are hired comports with legal strictures of 
Title VII. Moreover, even when a religious entity does advance 
a doctrinal justification, the inquiry may still be one of pretext 
rather than doctrine. 154 As the Second Circuit reasoned in 
DeMarco, "the inquiry is directed toward determining whether 
the articulated purpose is the actual purpose for the chal-
lenged employment-related act."155 
The strongest argument concerning the potential for exces-
sive entanglement is set forth in Oliver Thomas' analysis of 
EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary. 156 In 
Southwestern Baptist, the court determined that, although 
members of the Seminary staff were ordained as ministers, 
because they did not perform "ministerial duties," decisions 
regarding their employment were subject to judicial scruti-
ny.157 The court delineated as "ministerial" those duties 
which included "swearing in offices, conducting wedding and 
funerals, and dedicating babies."158 Although the Fifth Circuit 
found such standards workable, as Thomas observes, "such line 
drawing between religious and non-religious functions involves 
significant governmental entanglement with religion and, 
153. See supra notes 21-103 discussing the Free Exercise Clause. 
154. See DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 170-71 (2d Cir. 1993); 
see also supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text discussing DeMarco. 
155. Id. at 171. 
156. See Thomas, supra note 11, at 105 (analyzing EEOC v. Southwestern Bap-
tist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981». 
157. Id. at 285. 
158. Id. at 284. 
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therefore, is highly suspect under the First Amendment."159 
Insofar as the right of churches to discriminate depends on 
the nature of the employment position in issue, Thomas cor-
rectly perceives the potential for courts to become embroiled in 
complicated determinations of what constitutes ministerial 
versus non-ministerial functions. Nevertheless, it is important 
to recognize that "line-drawing" is crucial to the execution and 
enforcement of anti-discrimination law against religious insti-
tutions. Because legal determinations concerning employment 
discrimination by a religious entity depend on whether the em-
ployee position is ministerial, courts must have some means of 
distinguishing between ministerial versus non-ministerial 
duties. Absent a standard, nothing can prevent churches from 
prevailing against discrimination claims by defending every 
discriminatory decision on the grounds that the employee as-
sumed at least some clergy-like responsibilities. 
"Line-drawing" enables courts to differentiate among vari-
ous employee positions, thereby aiding the process of resolving 
disputes where the employee's duties are not easily defined. In 
cases where employee responsibilities are clearly non-ministe-
rial, "line-drawing" also reduces the need for particularized 
inquiries which the Supreme Court has traditionally sought to 
avoid. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence demonstrates that 
the state interest in eradicating invidious sex discrimination 
may override such First Amendment guarantees as free speech 
and the right to associate. 16o If the elimination of gender dis-
crimination is indeed so compelling,161 than this type of "line 
drawing" is necessary to accommodate both religious freedom 
and gender equality so that the preservation of one does not 
occur at the expense of the other. 
159. Thomas, supra note 11, at 105. 
160. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); see also supra 
notes 21·103 and accompanying text discussing the Free Exercise Clause. 
16l. See Roberts, 468 u.s. at 623-24. 
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B. CONSTITUTIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE FREE EXERCISE 
ANn ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
In evaluating the employment dispute under the Estab-
lishment Clause, it is important to recognize the overlapping 
Constitutional considerations of the Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment Clause which theoretically compel the application of 
anti-discrimination law to religious entities. Under the First 
Amendment, private institutions cannot claim exemption from 
anti-discrimination laws when their conduct implicates state 
interests of the "highest order".162 Religious entities, on the 
other hand, are permitted to discriminate on the basis of reli-
gion. 163 
As the Free Exercise discussion demonstrates, however, 
gender discrimination at the non-ministerial level is generally 
not supported by religious doctrine, but rather, represents 
secular employment decisions. Therefore, when courts permit 
religious institutions to commit sex discrimination outside 
ministerial functions, the courts are not only allowing religious 
institutions to engage in illegal conduct, but they are insulat-
ing the institutions from liability when they do so. 
From a constitutional perspective, religious institutions 
are being permitted to engage in "secular"-type decisions which 
are forbidden to their private counterparts. Consequently, this 
legal advantage elevates religious entities above private insti-
tutions with respect to generally applicable law; and as the 
Supreme Court jurisprudence demonstrates,l64 this kind of 
unequal treatment is precisely the type of promotion and spon-
sorship "respecting an establishment of religion"165 that the 
Establishment Clause historically forbids. 
162. See supra notes 21-103 and accompanying text discussing the Free Exercise 
Clause. 
163. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (1982). 
164. See generally, Lee v. Weisman, _ U.S. _ , 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); 
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.s. 602 (1971); Eversen v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 
1 (1947). 
165. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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IV. CHURCH AUTONOMY ANALYSIS 
Church autonomy, as the concept suggests, involves the 
right of religious institutions to function as autonomous, self-
governing units when deciding matters of faith, governance or 
administration.166 The Supreme Court has viewed this deci-
sion-making authority as an extension of Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clause principles, and thus, resolution of eccle-
siastical matters is traditionally unreviewable by civil authori-
ty.167 Such considerations as church governance and adminis-
tration are seen as internal matters within the province of the 
institution itself.16s 
Deference to church decision making in these ecclesiastical 
matters has lead Douglas Laycock to conclude that "the right 
of autonomy logically extends to all aspects of church opera-
tion.,,169 While this notion is not entirely inconsistent with 
past Supreme Court rulings, later decisions are hardly as sup-
portive of Laycock's position as he would have us believe. 
A. DECLINING STRENGTH OF THE CHURCH AUTONOMY 
PRINCIPLE 
In arguing that all church decisions should be immune 
from judicial scrutiny, Laycock relies on seminal decisions such 
as Watson v. Jones 170 and Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese 
166. See Thomas, supra note 11, at 89. 
167. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). Watson represents the 
Supreme Court's first confrontation with internal church dispute. Litigation arose 
when the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church of Louisville, Kentucky, suffered a 
split due to an internal mandate that divided its members. In resolving the ensu-
ing dispute, the Court looked to the hierarchial policy within the Presbyterian 
Church 
and determined that its highest authoritative body, the General Assembly, must 
issue the ultimate dispute resolution. [d. at 733-35. The Court adhered strongly to 
the notion that Federal Courts are inappropriate to resolve matters involving reli-
gious doctrine and thus it was binding on the courts to accept the final rulings of 
the General Assembly . 
. 168. See, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 
(1976); Keldroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952). 
169. Laycock, supra note 152, at 1397. 
170. 80 U.S. (13 WalL) 679 (1871). 
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v. Milivojevich 171 which reflect the Supreme Court's early def-
erential approach to the autonomy issue. 172 In doing so, how-
ever, Laycock ignore::; later cases which undercut his expansive 
notion of church autonomy. 
The first in a line of cases to do so was Jones v. Wolr3 
in which the Court dispensed with the notion of absolute defer-
ence. In its place the Court expressly sanctioned the applica-
tion of "neutral principles of law" to internal property dis-
putes. 174 The Supreme Court thus gave lower courts two al-
ternative methods of resolution when faced with property divi-
sion disputes: courts could either defer to the "authoritative 
ecclesiastical body," or examine religious documents them-
selves in order to discern legal intent. 175 Although the latter 
approach precluded courts from resolving questions of religious 
doctrine, this grant of discretion to civil courts, to "substitute 
this conventional dispute-resolution method in place of defer-
ence," significantly undermined any absolute notion of church 
autonomy. 176 
1. Dayton And The Denial Of Investigative Immunity 
Church autonomy was further eroded with the 1986 deci-
sion of Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian 
Schools. 177 In Dayton, the Supreme Court finally confronted 
the application of anti-discrimination law to a parochial high 
school. 178 The school had terminated the teaching contract of 
a female employee, Linda Hoskinson, based upon its religious 
belief that mothers of infant children should not assume work 
responsibility outside the home. 179 In response to the 
teacher's charge of sex discrimination, the state initiated an 
171. 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
172. Laycock, supra note 152 at 1397. 
173. 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
174. [d. at 602. 
175. [d. at 601. 
176. [d. 
177. 477 U.S. 619 (1986). 
178. [d. at 621-22. 
179. [d. at 623. 
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investigation of school employment policies. lso The school 
promptly refused to submit to the investigation. lsl 
The issue ultimately before the court was the right of the 
commission to exercise jurisdiction over the school under the 
First Amendment. Although the Supreme Court declined to 
review the school teacher's specific claim, it unanimously held 
that the exercise of jurisdiction over and the investigation of 
the parochial school did not violate the First Amendment. ls2 
The legal impact of the Dayton decision upon the present 
dispute is twofold. First, on its face, the opinion strongly un-
dercuts positive law support for a theory of investigative im-
munity for religious institutions. This principle, as it translates 
in the employment context, means that churches who claim 
process-based immunity from enforcement of employment dis-
crimination law must look to something other than legal prece-
dent to support their claim. Moreover, any claim to autonomy· 
which rests on entanglement principles is also likely to be 
unsuccessful after Dayton. 
Although Dayton did not expressly deal with entanglement 
issues, and although the entanglement issue primarily raises 
Establishment Clause concerns, Laycock believes that "entan-
glement cases... support a broad rule of church autono-
my."lS3 However, the removal of investigative immunity from 
the religious institution at issue, and the corresponding in-
volvement between that institution and the state, indicate that 
Laycock's theory cannot find support in Dayton. 
2. Erosion Of Catholic Bishop 
Professor Laycock's reliance on the Supreme Court deci-
sion in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago lS4 is equally un-
persuasive. ls5 In Catholic Bishop, the Court examined wheth-
180. [d. 
181. [d. at 624. 
182. Dayton, 477 U.S. at 628. 
183. Laycock, supra note 152, at 1397. 
184. 440 U.S. 490 (1979). 
185. See Laycock, supra note 152 at 1400. 
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er the National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter "the Act") 
would violate the First Amendment by granting the NLRB 
power to regulate labor relations between lay faculty and their 
parochial school employers. ls6 The Court applied a test which 
initially looked at whether application of the Act would raise 
serious First Amendment concerns. 1S7 Because it did, the 
Court then decided whether Congress expressed an affirmative 
intent to apply the Act to religious institutions. lss In the ab-
sence of such expression, the Court presumed that Congress 
did not intend the statute to apply to the case at issue. ls9 
Recognizing that NLRB supervision over the School could 
result in excessive entanglement of government with religion, 
the Court refused to allow the Board to exercise that pow-
er. 190 In a 5-4 opinion which provoked vigorous dissent, the 
Court held that, despite the Act's broad definition of "employ-
er," Congress did not intend to bring the school within the 
jurisdiction of the Board.19l 
Whether the Catholic Bishop Court was sincere in its 
statutory construction of the Act is questionable given the 
Court's later language: "We decline to construe the Act in a 
manner that could in turn call upon the Court to resolve diffi-
cult and sensitive questions arising out of the guarantees of 
the First Amendment Religion Clauses."192 The Court instead 
focused upon the likelihood that resolution of labor practice 
complaints by the NLRB would "necessarily involve inquiry 
into the good faith of the position asserted by the clergy-ad-
ministrators and its relationship to the school's religious mis-
sion."193 
Although Laycock emphasizes Catholic Bishop as support-
ing his argument,194 narrow statutory constructions of Title 
186. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 491. 
187. [d. at 495-96. 
188. [d. 
189. [d. 
190. [d. at 502. 
191. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 507. 
192. [d. at 507. 
193. [d. at 502. 
194. See Laycock, supra note 152, at 1399-1407. 
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VII have consistently led federal courts to reach the opposite 
conclusion. Catholic Bishop has thus been eroded, rather than 
followed, by most circuit courts deciding employment discrimi-
nation disputes. 
In DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School,195 for example, 
the Second Circuit determined that application of the ADEA to 
a Catholic parochial school did not pose a serious risk of entan-
glement under Catholic Bishop.196 Although application of the 
ADEA would raise serious constitutional concerns, thus impli-
cating the first prong of the Catholic Bishop test, the court 
found that ADEA actions did not violate the Establishment 
Clause.197 In comparing the facts of Catholic Bishop to the 
case at bar, the court noted "the important distinction between 
the ongoing government supervision of all aspects of employ-
ment required under labor relations statutes like the NLRA 
and the limited inquiry required in anti-discrimination dis-
putes."198 Significantly, the DeMarco court held that, even if 
the case did present serious entanglement concerns, the rea-
soning of Catholic Bishop still supported application of the 
ADEA because Congress implicitly intended to apply the 
ADEA to religious institutions. 199 Following "principles of 
statutory construction enunciated by the Supreme Court in 
NLRB,,200 the Court found that "religious institutions that 
otherwise qualify as 'employers' are subject to Title VII provi-
sions relating to discrimination based on race, gender and 
national origin.,,201 
A result similar to DeMarco was reached only a month 
later by the Third Circuit in Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed 
Virgin Mary School.202 In holding the ADEA applicable to a 
church-operated elementary school, the Court once again con-
sidered the distinction between the "pervasive jurisdiction" in 
Catholic Bishop versus the "simple prohibitions" of the 
195. 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993). 
196. [d. at 172. 
197. [d. 
198. [d. at 169. 
199. [d. at 172. 
200. DeMarco, 4 F.3d at 172-73. 
201. [d. at 173. 
202. 7 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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ADEA.203 Unlike DeMarco, however, the Third Circuit did not 
reach the issue of Congressional intent, but instead focused 
upon the potential for entanglement if the institution was 
forced to comply with ADEA policy. Because the Third Circuit 
found "an absence of any direct conflict between the ADEA's 
secular prohibition and the proffered religious doctrine," it 
concluded that there was no need to invoke the interpretive 
rule of Catholic Bishop.204 
The Geary court's analysis went beyond that of the Second 
Circuit in DeMarco by considering challenges to the good faith 
of an institution whose proffered reason for an employment 
decision may be pretextual. In the Geary court's opinion, such 
a determination still would not run afoul of entanglement 
concerns in Catholic Bishop.205 Contrary to the Supreme 
Court's concern that state regulation of labor relations "neces-
sarily involve inquiry into the good faith of [religious enti-
ties],,,206 the Third Circuit held that "a conclusion that the 
religious reason did not in fact motivate dismissal would not 
implicate entanglement since that conclusion implies nothing 
about the validity of the religious doctrine or practice and, 
further, implies very little about the good faith with which the 
doctrine was advanced to explain the dismissal.,,207 
Finally, while the Catholic Bishop Court was concerned 
with the "process of inquiry" involved in labor relations investi-
gation and its attendant potential for judicial intrusion into 
church doctrine, the Third Circuit found such concerns unper-
suasive.208 According to the Geary court, asking an institution 
about the motives behind its action, at most, calls upon that 
institution to explain the application of its own doctrine. 209 
Moreover, because courts are restricted from passing judgment 
on validity of this doctrine, "the burden of the religious institu-
203. [d. at 328. 
204. [d. 
205. [d. at 33l. 
206. [d. at 330. 
207. Geary, 7 F.3d at 330. 
208. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 502. 
209. Geary, 7 F.3d 324 at 330. 
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tion to explain is considerably lighter than in a non-religious 
employer case.'1210 
3. Dual Importance Of The Recent Cases Which Erode 
Catholic Bishop 
While the language of the DeMarco211 and Geary212 de-
cisions is not couched in terms of church autonomy, their hold-
ings clearly affect the extent to which religious institutions 
may regard themselves as self-governing units insulated from 
government regulation. Common to both decisions is a tenden-
cy to regard discrimination investigations as only minimally 
invasive of church autonomy. This tendency in turn fosters a 
greater willingness of courts to challenge church authority in a 
manner previously reserved for non-religious institutions. 
The dicta in Geary is particularly damaging to the notion 
of church autonomy because it suggests that even pretextual 
inquiries into the good faith of an institution may be condoned 
as religiously neutral. Viewing such inquiries as neutral not 
only grants the courts greater latitude in investigating discrim-
ination disputes, but an easier means of imposing liability 
when discriminatory motives are suspected. Moreover, these 
consequences are entirely consistent with the Supreme Court's 
Dayton213 decision which similarly exposed religious institu-
tions to investigative scrutiny. Taken together, the federal 
decisions seriously discredit religious institutions who might 
resist compliance with anti-discrimination regulation on 
church autonomy grounds. 
It is important to realize that the DeMarco and Geary 
decisions, while ostensibly departing from traditional Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, are in fact supportive of the Court's gen-
eral stance toward church autonomy. Autonomy principles are 
in place to ensure that there is no governmental encroachment 
into the "substantially religious activities and purpose" of secu-
210. Id. 
211. 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993). 
212. 7 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 1993). 
213. Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619 
(1986). 
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lar entities;214 thus, the rationale which denies exemption 
from Free Exercise and Establishment Clause principles ap-
plies with equal force to church autonomy. A church which is 
unable to justify its non-ministerial employment decisions on 
religious grounds should not be permitted to argue in favor of 
autonomy concerning the "ecclesiastical" nature of the dispute. 
Absent the necessary religious justification, courts are 
thus left to rule on the legality of an administrative choice 
based on secular considerations or, in other words, a civil is-
sue.215 
B. THE CIVIL NATURE OF RELIGIOUS EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 
As the foregoing discussion implies, employment disputes 
are neither internal nor purely ecclesiastical. One example of 
the way in which religious employment disputes are not inter-
nal is the obvious situation when the plaintiff herself is not a 
member of the church which discriminates against her. Such a 
situation becomes increasingly difficult to classify as "internal" 
the more attenuated the position is from ministerial duties. 
More fundamentally, the interests protected in civil rights 
actions are not only those of the parties themselves, but those 
of the public at large. As one commentator observed: "The 
content of church policy is an 'internal matter'; the lawfulness 
of that policy is not."216 Thus, a compelling reason for holding 
churches accountable for their discriminatory behavior is that 
religious institutions have enormous capacity to influence be-
havior and moral convictions far beyond the church polity 
itself. Insofar as the treatment of women within a religious 
institution indirectly impacts other spheres of society, those 
who suffer the consequences of unfair treatment have a vital 
interest in the regulation of church behavior. 
214. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 50l. 
215. See Young & Tigges, Into the Religious Thicket-Constitutional Limits on 
Civil Court Jurisdiction Over Ecclesiastical Disputes, 47 OHIO ST. L. J. 475 (1986) 
(identifying the resolution of such disputes as civil in nature). 
216. Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption And Religious Institutions: The Case 
Of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 409 n.67 (1987). 
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1. Traditional Treatment Of Church Autonomy 
In the church autonomy context, there is a strong case for 
deferring to a religious institution on matters that are genu-
inely internal to the institution and rest on religious principles. 
However, according to the Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf,217 
disputes over church property are not internal. If such disputes 
are outside the exclusive authority of the church, then the 
widespread deleterious effects of gender discrimination certain-
ly removes it from being an internal church consideration. 
Rather, as one critic of church autonomy concludes, "If Jones 
undercuts ex post church autonomy in disputes that are sub-
stantially 'internal,' there can be no case left for such autono-
my when external interests mount.,,21B 
Given the recent federal courts' hostile disposition toward 
church-dominated employment discrimination disputes, at-
tempts to wrest church autonomy on ecclesiastical principles 
will also fail. In his argument concerning the continued viabili-
ty of the church autonomy concept, Oliver Thomas looks to the 
1987 decision in Crowder v. Southern Baptist Convention.219 
In Crowder, the Eleventh Circuit refused to settle a procedural 
argument regarding the election of officers within the Southern 
Baptist Convention.220 This refusal to "enter the Baptist 
fray',221 led Thomas to conclude that "Crowder is ample testi-
mony to the continued viability of the church autonomy princi-
ple.,,222 
2. A Departure From Traditional Jurisprudence 
Only five years before Crowder,223 however, the Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire proved that it was not only willing to 
resolve an intrachurch dispute, but willing to apply the legal 
217. 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
218. Lupu, supra note 216 at 409. 
219. See Thomas, supra note 11 at 92-93 (discussing Crowder v. Southern Bap-
tist Convention, 828 F.2d 718 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988)). 
220. See Crowder, 828 F.2d at 719-21. 
221. Thomas, supra note 11 at 93. 
222. [d. at 93. 
223. 828 F.2d 718 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). 
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standard previously reserved only for private property dis-
putes.224 In Reardon v. Lemoyne,225 four nuns contested the 
nonrenewal of their teaching contracts by their Catholic school 
employer.226 Their legal conflict with the authorities of the 
Roman Catholic diocese turned on the interpretation of specific 
provisions in the contract relating to termination of their em-
ployment. The issue was one of contract ambiguity. 
Although the Roman Catholic authorities urged the court 
to apply the deference rule and deny jurisdiction, the Reardon 
court instead cited Jones for the proposition that religious 
entities are not totally immune from responsibility under civil 
law.227 Therefore, because the controversy at hand involved 
contractual rights outside the doctrinal realm, the court rea-
soned that accepting jurisdiction and rendering a decision 
would not violate the First Amendment.228 Moreover, the 
court concluded that it would be "unfair and illogical to deny 
access to the civil courts in non-doctrinal matters to parties 
who have voluntarily entered into civil contracts."229 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire authorized the 
trial court to resolve the dispute by applying ordinary stan-
dards of contract law.230 In addition to evaluating the reasons 
proffered by the school, the trial court could consider "extrinsic 
evidence of dismissal practices at the Sacred Heart School and 
elsewhere within the diocese.,,231 The Supreme Court warned 
against passing judgment on contractual grounds which in-
volved Roman Catholic doctrine, but empowered the trial court 
to rule on the sufficiency of "any secular reasons for non-re-
newal or dismissal."232 Although it recognized the difficulty of 
the trial court's task, it nonetheless affirmed that "this task 
can be facilitated by keeping in mind the distinction between 
224. Reardon v. Lemoyne, 454 A.2d 428 (N.H. 1982). 
225. 454 A.2d 428 (N.H. 1982). 
226. [d. at 430. 
227. [d. at 431 (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979». 
228. [d. at 431-32. 
229. [d. at 432. 
230. The case was remanded for a hearing on the merits of plaintiffs' petition 
as to the Sacred Heart School Board members and a hearing on the erroneous 
dismissal of two defendants. [d. at 434. 
231. [d. 
232. [d. at 433. 
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non-doctrinal matters, wherein jurisdiction lies, and matters 
involving doctrine, faith or internal organization which are 
insulated from judicial inquiry.,,233 
3. Reardon's Impact On Church Autonomy 
The Reardon234 opinion is fascinating because it abides 
by the strictures of previous Supreme Court rulings, but points 
out the tension inherent in those decisions. Although nothing 
in past Supreme Court decisions contemplates the application 
of neutral principles of law to contractual disputes, such appli-
cation is wholly consistent with their underlying policy. The 
Reardon court accurately concluded that, because the interests 
at stake involved employment and personal welfare, reviewing 
the contract did not violate the Supreme Court's prohibition 
against inquiry into ecclesiastical matters. On the contrary, by 
applying ordinary principles of contract law, the New Hamp-
shire court confirmed the civil nature of the dispute. 
The fact that the question at issue in Reardon did not 
involve a doctrinal matter also reveals the Establishment 
Clause problem inherent in an overly broad notion of "eccle-
siastical" dispute. When a civil court either defers to church 
authority or dismisses an employment discrimination issue as 
non justiciable, it undermines the very principles of government 
neutrality the Establishment Clause was intended to guaran-
tee.235 Both methods of resolution, while ostensibly neutral in 
theory, have the practical effect of favoring religious entities 
because they allow the church to act as the final arbiter in 
determining the fairness of its own decisions.236 Each employ-
ment decision made by a church represents an affirmation of 
its independent judgment and authority. Thus, whenever a 
court declines to address the merits of that decision on First 
Amendment grounds, it is essentially permitting that judgment 
233. Id. While no mention is made by the Court of the level of insulation such 
internal matters might receive, the overall tenor of the decision implies that even 
doctrinal matters may not be insulated from judicial inquiry if they sanctioned 
discrimination. 
234. Reardon v. Lemoyne, 454 A.2d 428 (N.H. 1982). 
235. See Michael William Galligan, Note: Judicial Resolution of Intrachurch Dis-
putes, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 2007, 2021(1983). 
236. [d. at 2021. 
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to dictate the direction of the law.237 More important from a 
constitutional perspective is that private institutional authori-
ty is being denied similar treatment by the courts as are reli-
gious institutions. This absence of similar legal treatment 
represents a direct affront to the Establishment Clause. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While policy arguments which underlie the proposed appli-
cation of anti-discrimination law to churches are mentioned 
throughout the discussion, one particular notion raised by an 
opponent of such application is worth pointing out. Oliver 
Thomas regards religious institutions as important "mediating 
structures" not only because they provide meaning to their 
adherents, but because their very existence serves as a check 
on the power of the state.238 Thomas thus argues that "invad-
ing the integrity of these institutions by regulating their em-
ployment policies compromises and limits their role as checks 
on governmental power.,,239 
The essential point overlooked by Thomas' argument is 
that integrity of these institutions is not compromised by the 
regulation at the non-ministerial level. When the state is act-
ing on behalf of an oppressed segment of society, it is those 
individuals, and not the oppressive religious agents, that are 
deserving of such protection. A harm which impacts over half 
the human population, denigrating them to a consistently 
inferior status can hardly be justified by the competing right of 
an institution to hire whomever it wants. No institution has 
ever, nor should ever, exist absolutely free of governmental 
authority to regulate its functions; at some point the autonomy 
of every institution must yield to the legitimate popular inter-
est in gender equality as evidenced by Title VII. In the face of 
abusive forms of discrimination, religious agents hardly repre-
sent the "family-like buffers" that Thomas defends,240 but in-
stead, a powerful obstacle to the administration of justice for 
women. 
237. See id. 
238. See Thomas, supra note 11, at 107. 
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To date, the Supreme Court has successfully avoided con-
fronting this difficult issue. While the Dayton241 decision 
seemed to make resolution of the controversy inescapable, the 
Court's invocation of judicial abstention allowed them to post-
pone the decision at least a little longer. Nevertheless, given 
the resurgence of the issue in federal courts, as well as its 
elevation on the feminist agenda, this policy of judicial retreat 
is no longer tenable. Moreover, the need for the Court to re-
solve the issue is further compelled by the fact that churches, 
as the targets of an increasing volume of discrimination at-
tacks, have a right to be informed of precisely what forms of 
conduct will expose them to liability. 
Given the recent change in the Court's composition, one 
can at least assume that any decision reached regarding the 
issue will be informed by a feminist perspective.242 Indeed, 
while it is not absolutely certain how Justice Ginsburg will 
come out on the issue, her commentary concerning "Gender 
and the Constitution"243 provides some indication. In the arti-
cle, she examines the traditional role of women in American 
history. With a coincidental choice of words, Justice Ginsburg 
laments what she perceives as a theme dominating Anglo-
American literature: "women's place in a world controlled by 
men is divinely ordained."244 Throughout history, religious 
authorities have had a strong hand in perpetuating this theme. 
In the effort to loosen this "divine" grasp, federal courts have 
taken the lead and, as the tension between divinity and dis-
crimination continue to mount, the Supreme Court is encour-
aged to follow. 
241. Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619 
(1986). 
242. On August 3, 1993, seven years after the Dayton decision, Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg was appointed to the United States Supreme Court. She replaced 
Justice Byron White, becomming the second woman to sit on the nation's highest 
court. 
243. JUDITH C. AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAw 125-26 (1992). 
244. [d. 
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